Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., et al. by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-2-1994 
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., et al. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., et al." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 175. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/175 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________________ 
 
NOS. 93-1736 and 93-1737 
_____________________ 
 
LUCIEN B. CALHOUN; ROBIN L. CALHOUN, 
individually and as Administrators of the 
Estate of Natalie K. Calhoun, deceased 
 
v. 
 
YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A.; 
YAMAHA MOTOR CO., LTD.; PALMAS DEL MAR COMPANY; 
PALMAS DEL MAR, INC.; PALMAS YACHT CLUB, INC.; 
MARINA DE PALMAS YACHT CLUB, INC.; MAXXAM 
PROPERTIES, INC.; ABC CORPORATION; XYZ 
PARTNERSHIP(S); CANDELERO HOTEL CORPORATION; 
MARINA DE PALMAS SHIPYARD, INC. 
 
          Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. and 
          Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., 
          Appellants in No. 93-1736 
 
 
LUCIEN B. CALHOUN; ROBIN L. CALHOUN, 
individually and as Administrators of the 
Estate of Natalie K. Calhoun, deceased, 
 
          Appellants in No. 93-1737 
 
v. 
 
YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A.;  
YAMAHA MOTOR CO., LTD.; PALMAS DEL MAR COMPANY; 
PALMAS DEL MAR, INC.; PALMAS YACHT CLUB, INC.; 
MARINA DE PALMAS YACHT CLUB, INC.; MAXXAM 
PROPERTIES, INC.; ABC CORPORATION; XYZ 
PARTNERSHIP(S); CANDELERO HOTEL CORPORATION; 
MARINA DE PALMAS SHIPYARD, INC. 
 
_____________________________ 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 90-04295) 
_____________________________ 
 
  
Argued: April 13, 1994 
 
Before:  BECKER, MANSMANN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed  November 2, l994 ) 
 
 
   THOMAS A. MASTERSON, JR., ESQUIRE 
(ARGUED) 
   Manchel, Lundy & Lessin 
   1600 Market Street 
   33rd Floor 
   Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 
   WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., ESQUIRE 
   Taylor & Taylor 
   1801 Market Street 
   811 Ten Penn Center 
   Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 
   Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
   Lucien B. Calhoun and   Robin L. 
Calhoun 
 
 
   JONATHAN DRYER, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
   WILLIAM R. HOFFMAN, ESQUIRE 
   Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, 
      Edelman & Dicker 
   The Curtis Center - Suite 830 East 
   Independence Square West 
   Philadelphia, PA  19106 
 
   Attorneys for Appellants/Cross-Appellees 
   Yamaha Motor Corporation,  
 U.S.A. 
   and Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. 
  
 
 ______________________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
  
 These consolidated interlocutory cross appeals before 
us pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1993) present an interesting 
and important question of maritime law:  whether state wrongful 
death and survival statutes are displaced by a federal maritime 
rule of decision concerning the remedies available for the death 
of a recreational boater occurring within state territorial 
waters,1 which are explicitly excluded from the reach of the 
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1975). The 
remedies at issue are loss of society, loss of support and 
services, loss of future earnings, and punitive damages. 
 This case arose when Natalie Calhoun, the twelve year 
old daughter of plaintiffs Lucien and Robin Calhoun, was killed 
in a boating accident in the waters off Puerto Rico.  Natalie had 
been riding a "Wavejammer," a type of jet ski manufactured by 
Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., and its parent company, Yamaha 
Motor Company, Ltd. (collectively referred to as "Yamaha").  
Plaintiffs sued Yamaha seeking recovery under the Pennsylvania 
wrongful death and survival statutes, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
8301-8302 (1982 & Supp. 1994).  In granting partial summary 
judgment for Yamaha on the issue of available damages, the 
district court held that federal maritime law displaced both 
state remedies, and fashioned a federal common law rule 
                     
1
  "State territorial waters" refers to waters within the 
territorial limits of a state, as well as "the coastal waters 
less than three nautical miles from the shore of a state."  
William C. Brown, III, Problems Arising from the Intersection of 
Traditional Maritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal Injury 
Liability, 68 TUL. L. REV. 577, 581 (1994). 
  
applicable to cases involving the death of a non-seaman in 
territorial waters under which future earnings and punitive 
damages are not recoverable but damages for loss of society or 
support are.  Each party sought certification to appeal the 
portion of the court's ruling that was unfavorable. 
 We do not reach the question whether the district court 
fashioned the proper federal common law remedy, however, because 
we conclude that the federal maritime law does not displace state 
wrongful death or survival statutes in this context.  Rather, 
applying traditional admiralty choice of law principles, we hold 
that the appropriate rule of decision in this area should be 
supplied by state law.  Our analysis of the Supreme Court's 
maritime wrongful death jurisprudence reveals that there is no 
federal substantive policy with which state wrongful death or 
survival statutes conflict here.  In the absence of a clear 
conflict, state law rules of decision should apply.  We will 
therefore affirm the district court's order denying Yamaha 
partial summary judgment, reverse the order granting Yamaha 
partial summary judgment, and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On remand, the 
district court will have to determine whether the plaintiffs' 
claims are governed by the laws of Pennsylvania or of Puerto 
Rico, and how the wrongful death and survival laws of those 
Commonwealths bear upon plaintiffs' damages. 
 
 I.  FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND SCOPE 
 OF THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
  
 
 On July 6, 1989, while vacationing with her parents at 
Palmas Del Mar Resort, Humacao, Puerto Rico, Natalie Calhoun 
rented a Yamaha "Wavejammer."  While she was riding the 
"Wavejammer," Natalie slammed into a vessel anchored in the 
waters off the hotel frontage and was killed.  At the time of her 
death, Natalie was twelve years old.  Her parents, Lucien and 
Robin Calhoun, individually and in their capacities as 
administrators for the estate of their daughter, sued Yamaha in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
seeking recovery under the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute, 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (1982 & Supp. 1994), and the 
Pennsylvania survival statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 
(1982).  Their complaint invoked federal jurisdiction both on the 
basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1993),2 
and admiralty, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1993).  The theories of 
recovery alleged in the complaint included negligence, strict 
liability, and breach of the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for purpose.  The complaint sought 
damages for lost future earnings, loss of society, loss of 
support and services, and funeral expenses.  It also requested 
punitive damages. 
 On November 27, 1991, Yamaha moved for partial summary 
judgment asserting that the damages recoverable in the action, if 
                     
2
  The Calhouns are citizens of Pennsylvania; Yamaha Motor 
Corporation, U.S.A. is a California corporation, and Yamaha Motor 
Company, Ltd. is a Japanese corporation. 
  
any, were governed by the federal admiralty law, and that under 
that law the plaintiffs were not entitled to lost future wages, 
loss of society, loss of support and services, or punitive 
damages.3  In its decision on the motion, the district court:  
(1) agreed with Yamaha that the federal common law of admiralty 
governed the Calhouns' wrongful death and survival actions; (2) 
held that the general maritime wrongful death cause of action 
recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 
90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970), displaced the Pennsylvania wrongful death 
and survival statutes and hence that any available remedy was a 
function of federal common law; and (3) held that under this 
federal common law remedy, lost future wages and punitive damages 
could not be awarded but loss of society and loss of support and 
services could be.  The court therefore granted Yamaha's motion 
for summary judgment on the loss of future earnings and punitive 
damages, and denied its motion respecting the claims for loss of 
society and loss of support and services. 
 Yamaha moved the district court to certify for 
immediate interlocutory appeal, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1993), the 
question whether the plaintiffs should be able to recover damages 
for the loss of Natalie's society.  Believing that the question 
was extremely close, the district court granted the motion and 
certified the issue to this court.4  Plaintiffs then requested 
                     
3
  Yamaha has conceded that funeral expenses are compensable. 
4
  Section 1292(b) allows for immediate appeal of interlocutory 
orders (1) which involve a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 
where an immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate 
  
that the district court amend its certification order to add the 
question whether future earnings and punitive damages were 
recoverable.  The district court agreed, and certified the 
following question to this Court: 
 The questions of law certified to the Court 
of Appeals are whether, pursuant to [a 
federal] maritime cause of action, plaintiffs 
may seek to recover (1) damages for the loss 
of the society of their deceased minor child, 
(2) damages for the loss of their child's 
future earnings, and (3) punitive damages. 
 
Both parties petitioned for permission to appeal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a).  We granted both 
petitions and consolidated the appeals.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1993). 
 The district court's statement in the certification 
order is limited to the question of what damages are available 
under a federal maritime cause of action.  On appeal, however, 
the parties have also (properly) briefed the question whether 
federal maritime law displaced state wrongful death and survival 
statutes.  As will appear, the answer to the certified question 
depends in large part on the resolution of the displacement 
question.  We presume that the district court intended this 
important question of displacement to be considered.  But even if 
such were not the case, it would not affect our jurisdiction. 
 As provided in Section 1292(b), we have before us an 
appeal from the challenged order, not just the certified 
                                                                  
termination of the litigation and (2) which the Court of Appeals 
permits pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b); FED. R. APP. P. 5(a). 
  
question.  Section 1292(b) requires not that we answer the 
certified question, but that we decide an appeal from an 
interlocutory order.  We therefore are not bound by the district 
court's formulation of the question, and may address any issue 
that is necessary to decide the appeal before us.  See In re 
School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).  There 
the district court certified for appeal an order certifying a 
compulsory class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B), but after taking jurisdiction we also 
reviewed the court's denial of certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  
Id. at 1002.  See also Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 
(3d Cir. 1973) (stating that appeals court is not bound by 
district court's statement of the issue on Section 1292(b) 
appeal), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974); 9 
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 110.25[1], at 300 (2d 
ed. 1994) ("[I]t is the order that is appealable, and not the 
controlling question identified by the district court.  Thus, the 
court of appeals may address any issue necessary to decide the 
case before it.") (footnote omitted).  The displacement question, 
which, in our view, is the critical question raised by this 
appeal, is therefore appropriately before us, and we turn 
immediately to it.  The questions are ones of law and our review 
is plenary. 
 
 II.  ADMIRALTY LAW AND DISPLACEMENT OF STATE LAW: 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
  
 As we have noted, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged 
federal jurisdiction on the basis of both diversity of 
citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1993), and admiralty, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1993).5  The Supreme Court has instructed us 
that "[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of 
substantive admiralty law."  East River S.S. Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2298-99 
(1986).  But knowing that substantive admiralty law applies does 
not really resolve the question whether federal or state law 
provides the relevant rule of decision.  "Although the corpus of 
admiralty law is federal in the sense that it derives from the 
                     
5
    Since this accident involved the allision of a pleasure 
craft (the "Wavejammer") with another vessel on navigable waters, 
admiralty jurisdiction appears to have been appropriate.  See 
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2898 (1990); 
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677, 102 S. Ct. 
2654, 2659 (1982) (collision of two boats, neither of which had 
ever been engaged in commercial maritime activity, and where site 
of accident was on waters seldom, if ever, used for commercial 
activity, was within admiralty jurisdiction).  The Calhouns now 
argue that admiralty jurisdiction is inappropriate.  Although 
they are entitled to so argue and have reserved their right to 
appeal that question from a final order, we doubt that the 
existence or non-existence of admiralty jurisdiction matters to 
the question of remedies.  Even if this were solely a diversity 
case (in which event we would still have subject matter 
jurisdiction over these cross-appeals) or the parties were in 
state court, a federal maritime rule of decision applicable to 
the controversy would still displace a state rule that was in 
conflict.  Although Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 
S. Ct. 817 (1938), states that there is no general federal common 
law, it is well settled that there are areas in which specific 
bodies of federal common law operate, particularly admiralty.  
And where a federal rule (either statutory or common law) 
supplies a rule of decision in a particular case, it applies 
regardless of the basis of jurisdiction.  That is in part what 
the reverse-Erie doctrine tells us.  See Offshore Logistics, Inc. 
v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1986). 
  
implications of Article III evolved by the courts, to claim that 
all enforced rights pertaining to matters maritime are rooted in 
federal law is a destructive oversimplification of the highly 
intricate interplay of the States and the National Government."  
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 
373-75, 79 S. Ct. 468, 480 (1959).  See also American Dredging 
Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 987 (1994) (recognizing the 
continued vitality of this principle from Romero). 
 State and federal authorities jointly exercise 
regulatory authority over maritime matters.  Romero, 358 U.S. at 
375, 79 S. Ct. at 481.  As a result, state law can, and often 
does, provide the relevant rule of decision in admiralty cases.  
See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 
310, 321, 75 S. Ct. 368, 374 (1955) (state law determines the 
effect of breach of warranty in a marine insurance policy).  
Indeed, "[i]n the field of . . . maritime torts, the National 
Government has left much regulatory power in the States."  Id. at 
313, 75 S. Ct. at 370. 
 Whether a state law may provide a rule of decision in 
an admiralty case depends on whether the state rule "conflicts" 
with the substantive principles of federal admiralty law.  As 
Judge Aldisert explained in Floyd v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 844 
F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), "state law may supplement 
maritime law when maritime law is silent or where a local matter 
is at issue, but state law may not be applied where it would 
conflict with [federal] maritime law."  See also Askew v. 
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341, 93 S. Ct. 
  
1590, 1600 (1973) (courts in admiralty cases may reach beyond 
maritime precedents and apply state law "absent a clear conflict 
with the federal law"); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 
406, 409-10, 74 S. Ct. 202, 205 (1953) ("[S]tates may sometimes 
supplement federal maritime policies . . . ."); Sosebee v. Rath, 
893 F.2d 54, 56-57 (3rd Cir. 1990) (maritime law preempts 
territorial attorney fees provision that directly conflicts with 
federal law).  Thus, in the context of this case, the 
Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes (or the Puerto 
Rico death and survival actions) may apply unless they conflict 
with a substantive rule of federal admiralty law. 
 We view this question as being quite similar, if not 
identical, to the preemption analysis articulated in Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S. Ct. 573 (1943), 
and its progeny, see, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere 
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594, 93 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (1973); United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29, 99 S. Ct. 
1448, 1458-59 (1979); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 
U.S. 500, 507 n.3, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 n.3 (1988); O'Melveny & 
Myers v. F.D.I.C., 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2053 (1994).  These cases 
recognize that there are areas of unique federal interest which 
are entirely governed by federal law, but where federal law 
nevertheless "borrows," see Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 594, 
93 S. Ct. at 2398, or "incorporates" or "adopts," see Kimbell 
Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-30, 99 S. Ct. at 1458-59, state law except 
where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. 
  
 While it is clear that under certain circumstances the 
general maritime law -- including the wrongful death rule of 
Moragne -- may incorporate state law as its rule of decision, the 
Supreme Court has begun to view the distinction between federal 
law incorporating state law as a rule of decision and state law 
operating of its own force as of theoretical importance only.  
See O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2048 ("In any event, knowing 
whether `federal law governs' in the Kimbell Foods sense -- a 
sense which includes federal adoption of state-law rules -- does 
not much advance the ball.  The issue in the present case is 
whether the [state] rule of decision is to be applied . . . or 
displaced, and if it is applied it is of only theoretical 
interest whether the basis for that application is [the state's] 
sovereign power or federal adoption of [the state's] 
disposition.") (citation omitted).  More precisely, although 
drawing such a distinction identifies the sovereign "power" being 
exercised, it does not have any real bearing on the practical 
question whether the state law rule of decision will apply or be 
displaced.  See id.6  Thus, because it makes little practical 
                     
6
  See also Boyle, 487  U.S. at 507 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 2516 n.3 
("We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is 
possible to analyze it as the displacement of federal-law 
reference to state law for the rule of decision. [Citing Little 
Lake Misere and Kimbell Foods].  We see nothing to be gained by 
expanding the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond 
its practical effect, and so adopt the more modest terminology.  
If the distinction between displacement of state law and 
displacement of federal law's incorporation of state law ever 
makes a practical difference, it at least does not do so in the 
present case."); Martha Field, Sources of Law:  The Scope of 
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 977 & n.408 (1986) 
("[The] distinction between state law applying directly and state 
  
difference as to whether the general maritime law has 
incorporated state law or whether state law provides a rule of 
decision of its own force, we simply refer to the problem as 
"displacement of state law."7 
 In admiralty law, determining whether federal maritime 
law conflicts with and thus displaces state law has proven to be 
extremely tricky.  Although we are told time and again under 
maritime preemption doctrine that a conflict exists where state 
law prejudices the "characteristic features" of federal maritime 
law, or interferes with the "proper harmony and uniformity of 
that law," Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 37 
S. Ct. 524, 529 (1917), the Jensen language is little more than a 
convenient slogan, providing little guidance on the question 
whether there is a conflict.  See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. 
at 991 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The unhelpful abstractness of 
[the Jensen language] leaves us without a reliable compass for 
navigating maritime pre-emption problems.").  Indeed, the lack of 
a clearly delineated conflicts inquiry in this area has been 
                                                                  
law applying through federal reference is of dubious 
relevance."). 
7
  The correct analytic conclusion, we believe, is that admiralty 
law simply has not spoken to the factual situation of this case, 
see infra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! 
Bookmark not defined., 45-Error! Bookmark not defined., and that 
state laws accordingly apply of their own force.  Were we to find 
federal admiralty law governing wrongful death and survival 
actions applicable to the death of a recreational boater 
occurring within state territorial waters, however, our analysis 
would likely lead us to hold that admiralty law either does not 
displace or adopts (or incorporates) state (or territorial) tort 
law.  See infra at n.Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
  
problematic.  The Supreme Court has consistently struggled with 
setting the boundary between conflicting and non-conflicting 
state regulation in the area of maritime affairs, and has 
recently admitted, 
 [i]t would be idle to pretend that the line separating 
permissible from impermissible state regulation is 
readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or 
indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty 
jurisprudence.  Compare [Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 
365 U.S. 731, 81 S. Ct. 886 (1961)] (state law cannot 
require provision of maritime contract to be in 
writing), with Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co., 348 U.S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368 [(1955)] (state law 
can determine effect of breach of warranty in marine 
insurance policy). 
 
American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987-88 (parallel citation 
omitted).  See also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 
§ 1-17, at 49 (2d ed. 1975) ("The concepts that have been 
fashioned for drawing [the line between state and federal law] 
are too vague, as we have seen, to ensure either predictability 
or wisdom in the line's actual drawing."). 
 In our view, however, the maritime preemption doctrine 
is not significantly different from the preemption doctrine 
applicable to non-maritime contexts.  See American Dredging, 114 
S. Ct. at 992 (Stevens, J., concurring); Wilburn Boat Co., 348 
U.S. at 324, 75 S. Ct. at 376 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(maritime preemption analysis factors "are not unlike those 
involved when the question is whether a State, in the absence of 
congressional action, may regulate some matters even though 
aspects of interstate commerce are affected"); id. at 333, 75 
S. Ct. at 381 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("Since Congress has power 
  
to make federal jurisdiction and legislation exclusive, the 
[preemption] situation in admiralty is somewhat analogous to that 
governing state action interfering with interstate commerce.").  
Therefore, resort to non-maritime preemption doctrine by way of 
analogy may help sharpen the focus of the inquiry.8 
 Stated succinctly, in the absence of an express 
statement by Congress (express preemption), (implied) preemption 
could occur either where Congress intended that federal law 
occupy the field (field preemption) or where there is an actual 
conflict between state and federal law such that:  (1) compliance 
with both federal and state law is impossible; or (2) state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
                     
8
  The analogy is not perfect.  In  Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. 
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438 (1920), and Washington v. 
W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S. Ct. 302 (1924), the 
Supreme Court held that some state regulation of maritime 
matters, even where authorized by Congress, was precluded 
directly by the Constitution and the uniformity implications of 
its grant of federal maritime jurisdiction.  See Knickerbocker, 
253 U.S. at 163-64, 40 S. Ct. at 441; W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 
at 227-28, 44 S. Ct. at 302.  In Knickerbocker, however, a 
congressional enactment authorizing state workers' compensation 
laws to govern maritime workers was held unconstitutional 
"because their provisions were held to modify or displace 
essential features of the substantive maritime law."  Red Cross 
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124, 44 S. Ct. 274, 277 
(1924).  And in W.C. Dawson & Co., a similar congressional act 
was invalidated because it "permit[ted] any state to alter the 
maritime law and thereby introduce conflicting requirements."  
W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 228, 40 S. Ct. at 305.  Although 
these cases have not been explicitly overruled by the Court, they 
rest on a strong nondelegation doctrine the likes of which has 
not been seen since the 1930s.  At all events, by contrast to the 
situations in Knickerbocker and W.C. Dawson, as we detail below, 
here we discern no maritime law governing the plaintiffs' 
wrongful death and survival actions and no federal interest whose 
uniformity would be unconstitutionally impaired by application of 
state law. 
  
full purposes and objectives of Congress.  See California v. ARC 
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01, 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989) 
(antitrust).9 
 In non-maritime cases, the determination whether there 
is a conflict between state and federal law in large part turns 
on the interpretation of federal statutes.  See Wallis v. Pan 
American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 86 S. Ct. 1301, 1304 
(1966) ("Whether latent federal power should be exercised to 
displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress.").10  In 
                     
9
  The full Jensen preemption analysis is contained in the now 
famous passage stating that state legislation affecting maritime 
commerce is invalid "if it contravenes the essential purpose 
expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to 
the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or 
interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in 
its international and interstate relations."  Jensen, 244 U.S. at 
216, 37 S. Ct. at 529.  This language seems to include the 
express preemption and implied preemption concepts of the non-
maritime preemption doctrines.  The language also seems to leave 
room for field preemption, although it does not appear to 
reference it as clearly.  But as the First Circuit has recently 
recognized in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 
623, 626-27 (1st Cir. 1994), in American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 
987, the Supreme Court gave the Jensen "characteristic features" 
language a limited meaning.  "[I]t rea[d] the phrase to apply -- 
and apparently only to apply -- to a federal rule that either 
`originated in admiralty' or has `exclusive application there.'"  
Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 627.  Under this restrictive 
reading, wrongful death and survival statutes would materially 
prejudice no "characteristic feature" of admiralty because the 
wrongful death and survival remedies did not originate in or have 
exclusive application in admiralty.  Because applying these state 
remedies would not conflict with any congressional legislation, 
see infra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! 
Bookmark not defined., 45-Error! Bookmark not defined., the focus 
of the inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the 
application of state rules of decision will unduly interfere with 
the uniformity of federal maritime principles. 
10
  Maritime law is not simply a creature of statute but is more 
an amalgam of common law and statutory principles.  But as we 
  
addition, non-maritime cases employ a presumption against 
preemption.  That is, a court should construe a federal 
substantive rule in such a way that it does not conflict with a 
state rule in an area traditionally regulated by the states.  See 
ARC America, 490 U.S. at 102, 109 S. Ct. at 1665.  In admiralty 
law a similar presumption is incorporated in the case law by the 
requirement that there be a "clear conflict" before state laws 
are preempted.  See Askew, 411 U.S. at 341, 93 S. Ct. at 1600; 
cf. Ballard Shipping v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (stating that where a state remedy is aimed at a 
"great and legitimate state concern," a federal court must act 
with caution before finding displacement of state law). 
 In light of these general principles, the question in 
this case -- whether state statutory remedies can provide the 
rule of decision when a recreational boater is killed in 
territorial waters -- largely reduces to an inquiry into whether 
the different substantive admiralty rules articulated in federal 
statutes and at common law would be frustrated by the application 
of state law.  Pope & Talbot, Inc., 346 U.S. at 410, 74 S. Ct. at 
205 ("[A] state may not deprive a person of any substantial 
                                                                  
discuss in the next section, the development of the federal law 
of maritime deaths has become increasingly defined by statute, 
and the federal statutory schemes have taken a preeminent role in 
shaping the federal maritime death remedies, including those 
provided by federal common law.  This development, in our view, 
brings the federal admiralty preemption doctrine more into line 
with the run-of-the-mill preemption case law, where the focus of 
the inquiry is in large part on statutory interpretation.  Cf. 
Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 630-31 (looking to a recently 
enacted statute to determine whether a federal common law rule 
displaced a state statute). 
  
admiralty right as defined in controlling acts of Congress or by 
interpretative decisions of this Court."); Wilburn Boat Co., 348 
U.S. at 332, 75 S. Ct. at 381 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("State 
power may be exercised where it is complementary to the general 
admiralty law.  It may not be exercised where it would have the 
effect of harming any necessary or desirable uniformity."); 
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 228, 106 
S. Ct. 2485, 2497 (1986) ("[W]here Congress had spoken, or where 
general federal maritime law controlled, the States exercising 
concurrent jurisdiction over maritime matters could not apply 
conflicting state substantive law."). 
 But before determining whether the substantive federal 
policies concerning maritime deaths would be frustrated, it is 
important to know what policies have, and have not, been 
articulated.  This requires some understanding of the history 
behind the development of federal remedies for maritime deaths.  
Although the "tortuous development"11 of the federal remedies for 
maritime deaths is familiar to many, and has been amply described 
elsewhere in the case law,12 it is essential background, and so 
we will describe at least the major developments. 
                     
11
  Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 S. Ct. at 2488 ("The 
tortuous development of the law of wrongful death in the maritime 
context illustrates the truth of Justice Cardozo's observation 
that `[death] is a composer of strife  by the general law of the 
sea as it was for many centuries by the common law of the 
land.'") (quoting Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 
U.S. 367, 371, 53 S. Ct. 173, 174 (1932)). 
12
  See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 23-27, 111 
S. Ct. 317, 320-23 (1990); Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212-17, 106 
S. Ct. at 2488-91. 
  
 
 III.  THE RELEVANT FEDERAL LAW 
 A.  EARLIER BACKGROUND:  FROM THE HARRISBURG TO MORAGNE 
 In 1886, the Supreme Court held in The Harrisburg, 119 
U.S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140, that in the absence of an applicable 
state or federal statute, the general maritime law did not afford 
a wrongful death cause of action to the survivors of individuals 
killed on the high seas, or waters navigable from the sea.  The 
harshness of this rule prompted reaction from district and 
appeals courts, subsequent Supreme Courts, and Congress.  
District and appeals courts began to allow recovery for deaths 
within state territorial waters where the state had an applicable 
wrongful death statute.  See Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 
S. Ct. at 2489.13  The Supreme Court held in The Hamilton, 207 
U.S. 398, 28 S. Ct. 133 (1907), that state wrongful death 
statutes could, in limited circumstances, be applied to fatal 
accidents occurring on the high seas.14  Most importantly, 
                     
13
  Tallentire cited, inter alia, City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 108 
(S.D.N.Y. 1893) (state wrongful death statute may validly be 
applied to "maritime affairs within the state limits"), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 61 F. 364, 367-68 (2d Cir. 
1894) (application of state wrongful death statute to accident in 
state territorial waters valid "in the absence of any regulation 
of the subject by [C]ongress") (citing Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1873) and Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. (3 
Otto) 99 (1876)). 
14
  Under The Hamilton, state wrongful death statutes could apply 
in admiralty on the high seas where (1) the statutes were 
intended to apply on the high seas, see Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 
213, 106 S. Ct. at 2489, which was not often the case, id. at 
213-14, 106 S. Ct. at 2489-90 (quoting Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393 
n.10, 90 S. Ct. at 1784 n.10); and either (2) "the vessel upon 
which the wrongful act occurred was constructively part of the 
  
Congress, in 1920, enacted (1) the Death on the High Seas Act 
("DOHSA") which provided a federal wrongful death remedy for 
survivors of all persons, seamen and non-seamen, killed on the 
high seas, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761-768 (1975 & Supp. 1994), and (2) the 
Jones Act, which gives, among other things, a remedy for the 
wrongful death of a seaman resulting from a personal injury 
suffered during the course of the seaman's employment, 46 
U.S.C.A. § 688 (1975 & Supp. 1994). 
 These developments, particularly the enactment of DOHSA 
and the Jones Act, ensured that a wrongful death remedy would be 
available for most people killed in maritime accidents.  Thus, 
between 1920 and 1970, deaths on the high seas were remedied by 
DOHSA, deaths in territorial waters were remedied by state 
wrongful-death statutes, and deaths of seamen (whether on the 
high seas or in territorial waters) were remedied by the Jones 
Act.  The Harrisburg, however, remained troublesome.  Part of the 
trouble stemmed from the development of different theories of 
recovery for maritime deaths.  Explanation of this difficulty 
requires reference to the two basic theories on which a seaman 
can recover for personal injuries. 
                                                                  
territory of the state," or (3) "the wrongdoer was a vessel or 
citizen of the state subject to its jurisdiction even when beyond 
its territorial limits," id. at 214, 106 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting 
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 88 (N.D. Cal. 
1954)).  As Tallentire notes, however, the limitations placed on 
the operation of state statutes for deaths on the high seas made 
The Hamilton of little practical import in allowing recovery for 
wrongful death.  Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 213-14, 106 S. Ct. at 
2489-90. 
  
 First, the seaman can claim that the shipowner or some 
other potentially liable party was negligent; that is the basis 
for recovery under the Jones Act.  Second, the seaman can claim 
that the vessel was unseaworthy.  The doctrine of unseaworthiness 
basically imposes on a shipowner a nondelegable duty to provide 
seamen a vessel that is reasonably fit for its purpose;15 it is a 
"species of liability without fault."  Seas Shipping Co. v. 
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95, 66 S. Ct. 872, 877 (1946).16  The 
Harrisburg, however, sharply limited the operation of the 
doctrine of unseaworthiness when a seaman was killed (as opposed 
to just being injured) within territorial waters, in the 
following manner. 
 Under The Harrisburg there was no right to recover for 
wrongful death under federal maritime law, either on a negligence 
theory or on an unseaworthiness theory.  Although DOHSA allowed 
recovery based on unseaworthiness for deaths outside the three 
mile territorial limit, DOHSA did not apply to injuries within 
territorial waters.  This meant that a seaman's survivors could 
not take advantage of the unseaworthiness doctrine when the 
                     
15
  "[I]n the case of non-seamen, the only duty owed by ship-
owners is that of exercising due care under the circumstances."  
2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 81(c), at 7-9 n.18 (7th ed. 1994) (citing 
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 
S. Ct. 406 (1959)). 
16
  Sieracki is better known for its holding that longshore 
workers were entitled to a warranty of seaworthiness, id. at 97, 
66 S. Ct. at 878, thus creating "Sieracki-seamen."  That part of 
the case was made obsolete by the 1972 amendments to the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), see 33 
U.S.C.A. §§ 905(b) (1986), which precluded longshoremen from 
taking advantage of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. 
  
seaman was killed in territorial waters unless a state statute 
allowed recovery based on such a theory.  And although some state 
statutes did, see The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 79 
S. Ct. 503 (1959) (allowing wrongful death action based on the 
doctrine of unseaworthiness because New Jersey wrongful death 
statute was construed to allow such a theory), some did not, see 
Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 211 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 1968) 
(holding that Florida wrongful death statute did not allow 
recovery for unseaworthiness).SUBSEQUENT HISTORY NEEDED?    
 The Harrisburg also created a complete bar to recovery 
for unseaworthiness for "Jones Act seamen" killed in territorial 
waters when it was combined with Lindgren v. United States, 281 
U.S. 38, 50 S. Ct. 207 (1930), and Gillespie v. United States 
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S. Ct. 308 (1964).17  Lindgren and 
Gillespie held that the Jones Act was the exclusive wrongful 
death remedy for seamen and could not be supplemented by state 
wrongful death actions.18  The result was that, since the Jones 
Act allowed recovery only on the basis of negligence, the 
doctrine of unseaworthiness was of no aid to a Jones Act seaman 
who was killed within territorial waters.  See Kernan v. American 
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 428-30, 78 S. Ct. 394, 396-97 (1958). 
                     
17
  We use the term "Jones Act seamen" in contrast to "Sieracki-
seamen," see supra n.16. 
18
  It is important to note here that both Lindgren and Gillespie 
were limited to the preemptive effect of the Jones Act's wrongful 
death remedy on state wrongful death statutes.  They did not 
challenge the Supreme Court's holding in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. 
Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S. Ct. 455 (1944), that an injured Jones Act 
seaman could invoke the doctrine of unseaworthiness to sue for 
injuries, wherever contracted. 
  
 The combination of The Harrisburg, Lindgren, and 
Gillespie created disarray in the field of remedies for wrongful 
death of seamen, and led to three "anomalies" or "incongruities" 
in admiralty law that eventually made the regime intolerable.19  
"First, in territorial waters, general maritime law allowed a 
remedy for unseaworthiness resulting in injury, but not for 
death."  Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26, 111 S. Ct. 
317, 322 (1990). Second, survivors of seamen killed outside the 
three-mile territorial limit could pursue a wrongful death action 
based on unseaworthiness, while survivors of those killed inside 
territorial waters could not, unless a state wrongful death 
statute allowed recovery based on unseaworthiness.  Moragne, 398 
U.S. at 395, 90 S. Ct. at 1785.  Third, survivors of a "Sieracki-
seaman," see supra at n.16, could recover for a death within 
territorial waters under applicable state statutes, while 
survivors of a Jones Act seaman (a "true" seaman) could not.  
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-96, 90 S. Ct. at 1785. 
 In 1970 the Supreme Court decided that enough was 
enough, and in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 
375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970), the Court overruled The Harrisburg 
and recognized a general maritime wrongful death cause of action 
under federal common law.  Id. at 378, 90 S. Ct. at 1776.  
Moragne was, by all accounts, a landmark case.  Although its 
specific holding merely created a general maritime wrongful death 
                     
19
  The "anomalies" were explained in Moragne, 398 U.S. 394-96, 
90 S. Ct. at 1784-85. 
  
remedy based on the doctrine of unseaworthiness, it has since 
been interpreted as creating a wrongful death remedy based on 
negligence.  See GILMORE & BLACK § 6-33, at 368 ("The remedy 
provides recovery for deaths caused by negligence as well as for 
deaths caused by unseaworthiness . . . ."); Miles v. Melrose, 882 
F.2d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Miles v. Apex 
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).20  Moragne has, 
of course, been the focus of detailed analysis and description in 
the case law and commentaries, which we need not repeat here.  It 
is important, however, to point out that, to justify creating the 
general maritime wrongful death remedy, the Court invoked the 
                     
20
  The case law, however, does not uniformly hold that the 
Moragne wrongful death remedy applies to claims based on 
negligence.  See, e.g., Ford v. Wooten, 681 F.2d 712, 715-16 
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the Moragne remedy applies only to 
unseaworthiness, not negligence); Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, 
Inc., 606 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (same, as 
concerns Jones Act seamen). 
  
need for "uniform vindication of federal policies,"21 and the 
"humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty."22 
 One aspect of Moragne -- a jurisprudential one -- must 
however be related in some detail.  Moragne brought to the fore 
the importance of federal statutory remedies in determining the 
appropriate shape of the general maritime law.  At the time 
Moragne was decided, DOHSA and the Jones Act both provided 
wrongful death remedies in admiralty.  The existence of these 
statutory schemes left it unclear whether a court could create a 
federal common law rule in the area.  Although DOHSA and the 
Jones Act reflected a strong public policy favoring survivors' 
recovery for wrongful deaths, at the same time they also may have 
represented a considered legislative judgment that wrongful death 
remedies should go no further than those provided for by statute. 
                     
21
  As Justice Harlan put it: 
 
 Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death 
under general maritime law will assure uniform 
vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions 
and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity 
to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively 
maritime substantive concepts.  Such uniformity not 
only will further the concerns of both of the 1920 Acts 
[DOHSA and the Jones Act] but also will give effect to 
the constitutionally based principle that federal law 
should be a system of law coextensive with, and 
operating uniformly in, the whole country. 
 
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 401-02, 90 S. Ct. at 1788 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
22
  Id. at 387, 90 S. Ct. at 1780-81 (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 
Fed. Cas. 909-10 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578)).  The Moragne 
court recognized that the maritime law "included a special 
solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture 
upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages."  Id. 
  
 The undertaking in Moragne, in large part, was to 
determine whether the existing statutory remedies were to place a 
ceiling or a floor on available remedies for wrongful death.  
After searching the federal legislation and the case law, the 
Moragne court concluded that "Congress [had] given no affirmative 
indication of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a 
remedy for wrongful death to persons in the situation of [the] 
petitioner."  Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393, 90 S. Ct. at 1784.  In 
the absence of such an affirmative indication from Congress, the 
Court believed it appropriate to recognize a general maritime 
wrongful death cause of action.  As we detail below, this aspect 
of Moragne -- the importance of federal statutory schemes in 
shaping non-statutory remedies -- has been particularly far 
reaching in the Court's wrongful death jurisprudence since 
Moragne. 
 
 B.  THE POST-MORAGNE CASES:  GAUDET, HIGGINBOTHAM, 
 TALLENTIRE, AND MILES 
 Four post-Moragne decisions are particularly important 
to our decision:  Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 
573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 
U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. 
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986); and Miles v. 
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).  These 
cases have further refined the federal maritime cause of action 
recognized in Moragne and provide some outline of the legal 
architecture for maritime death claims.  But although they 
  
adumbrate the domains in which federal statutory, federal common 
law, and state statutory remedies operate to provide a rule of 
decision in maritime death cases, a brief survey of these 
decisions shows that significant areas of uncertainty remain. 
 1.  GAUDET 
 Gaudet addressed the types of damages available for a 
longshoreman killed in territorial waters, 414 U.S. at 573, 94 
S. Ct. at 806, and concluded that nonpecuniary damages for loss 
of society were available.  Id. at 587-88, 94 S. Ct. at 816.  
Although recognizing that DOHSA did not compensate for 
nonpecuniary losses, id. at 588 n.22, 94 S. Ct. at 816 n.22, the 
Court studiously ignored the example of DOHSA and followed the 
"humanitarian policy of the maritime law" that favored recovery 
for loss of society.  Id. at 588, 94 S. Ct. at 816.  Three 
aspects of Gaudet are worth mentioning.  First, the decision 
recognizes damages for loss of society as being available in a 
general maritime wrongful death action.  Id. at 587, 94 S. Ct. at 
816.  Second, on its face, Gaudet appears to approve of the 
application of state statutes in maritime death cases.23  See id. 
at 587-88, 94 S. Ct. at 816.  Third, and perhaps most important, 
Gaudet (together with its offspring, American Export Lines, Inc. 
v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980)) represents the 
first, and last, time that the Court departed from the guidance 
                     
23
  Gaudet also cited approvingly to a decision of this court, 
Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971), 
which joined a state survival statute to a general maritime 
wrongful death cause of action.  Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 588 n.24, 94 
S. Ct. at 817 n.24. 
  
of federal statutory wrongful death remedies in shaping recovery 
for wrongful death.24  Cf. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 601-02, 605, 94 
S. Ct. at 823, 825 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Indeed, since 
Gaudet, the Court, disapproving of that decision but reluctant to 
overrule it directly, has narrowed the case to its facts so that 
the decision may be, for all intents and purposes, a dead letter.  
See Miller v. American President Lines, 989 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th 
Cir. 1993) ("Although Gaudet has never been overruled, its 
holding has been limited over the years to the point that it is 
virtually meaningless."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993). 
 2.  HIGGINBOTHAM 
 In Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 618, 98 S. Ct. at 2010, 
the Court addressed the question whether survivors of a person 
killed on the high seas were entitled to recover damages under 
federal maritime law in addition to the damages available under 
DOHSA.  Of particular interest to the Court was whether the loss 
                     
24
  In American Export Lines, the Supreme Court held that general 
maritime law allowed the wife of a harbor worker to bring an 
action for damages for loss of society due to a maritime tort 
suffered by her husband.  Although DOHSA and the Jones Act did 
not themselves provide such non-pecuniary damages, the Court 
allowed them, reasoning à la Gaudet that DOHSA was the exclusive 
remedy only for "fatal injuries incurred on the "high seas," 446 
U.S. at 282, 100 S. Ct. at 1678, and that "the Jones Act does not 
exhaustively or exclusively regulate longshoremen's remedies," 
id. at 282-83, 100 S. Ct. at 1678. 
 Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 
(1990), allowed a maritime wrongful death action for the death of 
a Jones Act seaman in territorial waters due to unseaworthiness.  
Despite the Jones Act's provision of liability only for deaths 
due to negligence, the holding in Miles may still be seen as 
following congressional guidance in that DOHSA allowed recovery 
for deaths occurring on the high seas due to unseaworthiness, and 
the Court's holding merely harmonized those two statutes. 
  
of society damages recognized in Gaudet were available where the 
death occurred on the high seas notwithstanding the fact that 
DOHSA itself did not allow for loss of society damages.  The 
Court's answer was "no."  The reasoning of Higginbotham was 
straightforward:  Congress had specifically spoken to the issue 
of damages in DOHSA and provided damages only for pecuniary 
losses, and it was not open to the Court to authorize 
supplementary relief that went beyond that authorized by 
Congress.  Id. at 626, 98 S. Ct. at 2015.  Although not explicit 
in the decision, Higginbotham drew its inspiration directly from 
the statutory analysis in Moragne that we have identified 
above.25  The only difference between the analysis in Moragne and 
that in Higginbotham is that while Moragne saw a gap in the 
statutory scheme, Higginbotham saw none.  See id. at 625, 98 
S. Ct. at 2015. 
 3.  TALLENTIRE 
 Eight years later came Tallentire, 477 U.S at 207, 106 
S. Ct. at 2485, which involved a claim for damages for a death on 
the high seas.  This time the question was whether remedies 
available under a state wrongful death action could supplement 
the remedies available under DOHSA.  The Court again said "no," 
holding that the Louisiana wrongful death statute (which allowed 
recovery for loss of society) could not apply to a claim governed 
by DOHSA. Id. at 233, 106 S. Ct. at 2499.  Again, the analysis 
                     
25
  But see id. at 625, 98 S. Ct. at 2015 (citing Moragne's 
discussion of congressional intent concerning DOHSA). 
  
had been foreshadowed by Moragne and Higginbotham:  Congress had 
spoken directly to the question of damages for deaths on the high 
seas in DOHSA, and the Court was not free to supplement the 
statutory scheme (with a state law remedy). 
 The main battle in Tallentire, however, was not over 
the applicability of the Higginbotham mode of analysis to a state 
wrongful death statute;26 rather, the principal dispute was over 
the construction of Section 7 of DOHSA, which provided in 
pertinent part that 
 [t]he provisions of any State statute giving or 
regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall 
not be affected by this chapter. 
 
46 U.S.C.A. § 767 (1975).  A circuit split existed on the 
question whether this section preserved the operation of state 
wrongful death statutes for deaths on the high seas.  In a 5-4 
decision, the Court held that the clause was nothing more than a 
jurisdictional savings clause which preserved the rights of state 
courts to "entertain causes of action and provide wrongful death 
remedies both for accidents arising on territorial waters and, 
under DOHSA, for accidents occurring more than one marine league 
from shore."  Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 221, 106 S. Ct. at 2493. 
 Although the Court justified its result in part by 
stressing the advantage of having a uniform remedy for deaths on 
the high seas, see id. at 230-31, 106 S. Ct. at 2498-99, the 
                     
26
  Tallentire also discussed the applicability of the remedies 
afforded under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1331 et. seq. (1986 & Supp. 1994), id. at 217, 106 S. Ct. at 
2491, but that discussion is not pertinent here. 
  
Court's reasoning was ultimately grounded on its interpretation 
of the legislative history of Section 7 of DOHSA.  In surveying 
the legislative history of DOHSA, the Court stated that Section 7 
was included in the act in order to save state remedies within 
territorial waters.  According to the Court, "[t]he reach of 
DOHSA's substantive provisions was explicitly limited to actions 
arising from accidents on the high seas, so as to `prevent the 
Act from abrogating by its own force, the state remedies then 
available in state waters.'"  Id. at 224, 106 S. Ct. at 2495 
(quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 621-22, 98 S. Ct. at 2013) 
(internal citation omitted).  It concluded that 
 because DOHSA by its terms extended only to the high 
seas and therefore was thought not to displace these 
state remedies on territorial waters, [see Moragne], § 
7, as originally proposed, ensured that the Act saved 
to survivors of those killed on territorial waters the 
ability to pursue a state wrongful death remedy in 
state court. 
Id. at 224-25, 106 S. Ct. at 2495.  According to one commentator, 
the implication of the Court's decision in Tallentire is that 
although survivors of a person killed on the high seas may seek 
only the limited recovery provided by DOHSA, "[i]f the same 
accident occurs within a marine league from shore, where [DOHSA] 
has no effect, the survivors can recover damages under the state 
wrongful death statute, including, when provided, reimbursement 
for non-economic losses."  14 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3672, at 295 (Supp. 1994). 
 4.  MILES 
  
 The latest case in the Court's wrongful death 
jurisprudence is Miles, 498 S. Ct. at 19, 111 S. Ct. at 317.  In 
Miles, the mother of a Jones Act seaman killed in territorial 
waters pressed a Moragne cause of action based on the doctrine of 
unseaworthiness.  The Court considered two issues:  first, 
whether the Jones Act provided the exclusive measure of remedies 
for the death of a Jones Act seaman where recovery was premised 
on the Moragne cause of action, and second, whether a general 
maritime survival action recognized loss of future earnings for a 
Jones Act seaman.  The Court held that the Jones Act damages were 
the exclusive measure of damages allowed to a Jones Act seaman, 
regardless of whether the claim was based on Moragne; it then 
held that the Jones Act damages controlled any recovery based on 
a general maritime survival action for the death of a Jones Act 
seaman, and that since the Jones Act did not allow recovery for 
future earnings, they were not recoverable under Moragne.  Id. at 
32-33, 36, 111 S. Ct. at 326, 328. 
 Miles reflects the preeminence that the Moragne 
statutory analysis has achieved in shaping wrongful death 
remedies.  By the time of Miles, the entire inquiry into remedies 
for deaths has been reoriented into an inquiry into what the 
relevant statutes had stated. 
 We have described Moragne at length because it 
exemplifies the fundamental principles that guide our 
decision in this case.  We no longer live in an era 
when seamen and their loved ones must look primarily to 
the courts as a source of substantive legal protection 
from injury and death; Congress and the States have 
legislated extensively in these areas.  In this era, an 
admiralty court should look primarily to these 
legislative enactments for policy guidance. 
  
Id. at 27, 111 S. Ct. at 323.  But importantly for this appeal, 
Miles showed no great hostility to the operation of state 
statutes in providing rules of decision in admiralty cases. 
 The passage quoted above hints that state statutory 
schemes have a role to play in admiralty cases.  Such a role 
received fuller articulation later in the Miles opinion, where 
the Court discussed the question whether a general maritime 
survival action existed.  Although it ultimately declined to 
address the issue, the Court's discussion seemed to sanction some 
lower courts' practice of applying state survival statutes to 
deaths at sea.  Id. at 326 ("Most States have survival statutes 
applicable to tort actions generally, and admiralty courts have 
applied these state statutes in many instances to preserve suits 
for injury at sea. . . .  Where these state statutes do not 
apply, however, or where there is no state survival statute, 
there is no survival of unseaworthiness claims absent a change in 
the traditional maritime rule.") (internal citations and footnote 
omitted). 
 5.  EMERGING TRENDS 
 Although the trend in the post-Moragne case law can be 
explained by reference to the rise in the importance of federal 
statutory schemes in shaping maritime remedies, it would be 
myopic not to recognize the other forces at work.  One trend that 
cannot be ignored is that the Court seems to be cutting back on 
plaintiffs' rights in maritime actions.  Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, the Supreme Court expanded the rights of plaintiffs by 
generally allowing plaintiffs the benefit of whichever rule, 
  
state or federal, was more favorable to recovery.  See GILMORE & 
BLACK § 6-61, at 463-68.  Moragne -- or perhaps Gaudet -- 
represented the apex of the Court's policy of expanding 
plaintiffs' rights in admiralty actions.  Higginbotham, 
Tallentire, and Miles, in contrast, show a tendency on the part 
of the Court during the last two decades to reverse its policy of 
favoring seamen plaintiffs. 
 A second trend is the weakness with which the principle 
of uniformity, i.e., the notion that Moragne initiated a trend in 
the case law to make recovery for maritime deaths more uniform -- 
which permeates the rhetoric of the case law -- has been actually 
applied in these cases.  For, although the cases often mention 
uniformity as a guiding principle, the Court's actions belie its 
importance.  Higginbotham, for example, quite consciously created 
an anomaly (the unavailability of non-pecuniary damages for 
wrongful death at high sea where such damages were available to 
longshoremen killed in territorial waters), stating that "a 
desire for uniformity cannot override the statute [DOHSA]," 436 
U.S. at 624, 98 S. Ct. at 2014.  Similarly, Tallentire rejected a 
rule that would make DOHSA recoveries consistent with those 
available under Moragne for deaths on territorial waters.  See 
Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 233, 106 S. Ct. at 2499-500.  And Miles 
viewed the variety of survival actions under state law without 
alarm, declining to fashion a uniform federal rule on the matter 
that would cover all plaintiffs.  See 498 U.S. at 34, 111 S. Ct. 
  
at 326-27.27   We believe that the thrust of these cases suggests 
that the concept of uniformity has a good deal less weight than 
has been thought, see also Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 917 
(9th Cir. 1994) (invoking Gaudet and Higginbotham to reject 
uniformity argument untethered to statute), and that it has 
significance to the extent that it aids in the "vindication of 
federal policies," Moragne, 398 U.S. at 401, 90 S. Ct. at 1788. 
 
 C.  WRONGFUL DEATH VS. SURVIVAL ACTIONS IN THE SCHEMA 
 We have discussed this case law at such length because 
a thorough understanding of it is critical to our analysis of the 
issue presented here.  Before we turn to that analysis, however, 
we must identify another aspect of the legal background that 
often appears to be glossed over in the case law of maritime 
                     
27
  See also American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987: 
 
 "It is true that state law must yield to the needs of a 
uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds 
inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation 
still leaves the states a wide scope.  State created 
liens are enforceable in admiralty.  State remedies for 
wrongful death and state statutes providing for the 
survival of actions . . . have been upheld when applied 
to maritime causes of action. . . .  State rules for 
the partition and sale of ships, state laws governing 
the specific performance of arbitration agreements, 
state laws regulating the effect of a breach of 
warranty under contracts of maritime insurance -- all 
these laws and others have been accepted as rules of 
decision in admiralty cases, even, at times, when they 
conflicted with a rule of maritime law which did not 
require uniformity." 
 
(quoting Romero, 358 U.S. at 373-74, 79 S. Ct. at 480-81) 
(alterations and omissions in American Dredging). 
  
deaths.  Throughout the previous discussion of the case law, 
reference has been made to wrongful death actions and to survival 
actions.  Although they are often lumped together without any 
distinction, see Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 
1084, 1093 (2d Cir. 1993) (where plaintiffs treated as a single 
action a claim for "wrongful death and survivorship benefits"), 
they are, in fact, quite distinct.  See, e.g., Gaudet, 414 U.S. 
at 575 n.2, 94 S. Ct. at 810 n.2 (distinguishing wrongful death 
statutes from survival statutes). 
 A wrongful death cause of action belongs to the 
decedent's dependents (or closest kin in the case of the death of 
a minor).  It allows the beneficiaries to recover for the harm 
that they personally suffered as a result of the death, and it is 
totally independent of any cause of action the decedent may have 
had for his or her own personal injuries.  Damages are determined 
by what the beneficiaries would have "received" from the decedent 
and can include recovery for pecuniary losses like lost monetary 
support, and for non-pecuniary losses like loss of society.  2 
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 81(a), at 7-2.  A survival action, in 
contrast, belongs to the estate of the deceased (although it is 
usually brought by the deceased's relatives acting in a 
representative capacity) and allows recovery for the injury to 
the deceased by the action causing death.  Under a survival 
action, the decedent's representative recovers for the decedent's 
pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost earnings (both past 
and future), and funeral expenses.  Id. 
  
 The Jones Act (by incorporating the FELA) contains both 
a wrongful death provision and a survival provision.  Moragne, 
414 U.S. at 575 n.2, 576, 94 S. Ct. at 810 & n.2.  DOHSA contains 
a wrongful death provision, but does not contain a survival 
provision.  Id.  General maritime law contains a wrongful death 
action by way of Moragne, but the Supreme Court has not 
recognized a survival action.  As was mentioned above, both 
Tallentire and Miles have stressed that there is as yet no clear 
federal rule on the extent to which state survival remedies are 
available under DOHSA or Moragne.  See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-34 & 
n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 326-27 & n.2; Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 215 n.1, 
106 S. Ct. at 2490 n.1 (declining to approve or disapprove of the 
application of state survival statutes to cases involving deaths 
on the high seas). 
 With this distinction in mind, we now turn to the 
question whether state wrongful death and survival statutes 
conflict with the principles articulated in the post-Moragne line 
of cases. 
 
 IV.  CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS 
 As our previous analysis has shown, there is no federal 
rule, either statutory or at common law, that explicitly 
precludes the operation of state wrongful death or survival 
statutes in cases involving recreational boaters killed in 
territorial waters.  DOHSA applies only to deaths on the high 
seas.  The Jones Act applies only to seamen.  And no Supreme 
Court case has explicitly held that Moragne displaces state 
  
wrongful death or survival remedies for non-seamen killed in 
territorial waters.  Of course, federal law still should displace 
the state wrongful death and survival statutes if such statutes 
stand as obstacles to the accomplishment and execution of the 
clearly expressed policies of federal maritime law.  It appears, 
however, that neither state survival statutes nor wrongful death 
statutes stand as such obstacles. 
 
 A.  SURVIVAL STATUTES 
 The question whether federal maritime law displaces 
state survival statutes in the context of recreational boaters 
killed in territorial waters need not detain us long.  As we have 
explained above, there does not appear to be any substantive 
federal policy addressing survival actions for non-seamen.  
Although DOHSA does not contain a survival provision, its absence 
does not show that Congress expressed an "affirmative indication 
of an intent to preclude,"  see Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393, 90 
S. Ct. at 1784, state survival statutes from operating in 
territorial waters for, as Tallentire tells us, Congress 
specifically limited the reach of DOHSA "`so as to prevent the 
Act from abrogating by its own force the state remedies then 
available in state waters.'"  Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 224, 106 
S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 621-22, 98 
S. Ct. at 2013).28 
                     
28
  Indeed, as we have mentioned, Tallentire left open the 
question whether state survival statutes could provide a rule of 
decision even for death on the high seas.  See also Miles, 498 
U.S. at 34 n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 326-27 n.2; Dugas v. National 
  
 Moreover, although Moragne does not recognize a 
survival action, we do not believe that the Court's post-Moragne 
case law reflects any intent to preclude survival actions based 
on state law.  Quite the contrary, in its discussion of the 
possible existence of a general maritime survival remedy in 
Miles, the Court seemed to endorse (or at least not preclude) the 
practice of applying state survival statutes for deaths occurring 
within territorial waters.  See 498 U.S. at 33-34, 111 S. Ct. at 
326. 
 In light of this case law, we hold that federal 
admiralty law, as articulated both by statute and by the federal 
common law, does not preempt the application of state survival 
statutes for deaths of recreational boaters (non-seamen) within 
territorial waters.29  Such a holding, we believe, is the one 
most consistent with federal/state conflict of law principles, 
particularly the presumption against preemption.  See supra at 
typescript Error! Bookmark not defined..  In our view, a holding 
                                                                  
Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that in 
lawsuit premised on DOHSA, Pennsylvania survival statute could be 
applied concurrently).  And the Fifth Circuit has held, in the 
wake of the Gaudet, Higginbotham, Tallentire, and Miles quartet, 
that DOHSA does not preempt a general maritime survival action.  
Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 430 (1991); Graham v. Milky Way 
Barge, 824 F.2d 376, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1987). 
29
  We have alternated in our discussion between the terms 
"recreational boaters" and non-seaman, and we mean to use the 
terms interchangeably.  We do not mean to intimate that crew 
members of a racing yacht or some other non-recreational vessel 
should be treated differently than someone in Natalie Calhoun's 
position.  The applicable remedy depends on whether such crew 
members fall within the Jones Act as seamen. 
  
contrary to the one we reach would require the conclusion that 
federal admiralty law conflicts with state law in an area where 
neither Congress nor admiralty law has provided any rule of 
decision.  Such a holding would ignore traditional conflicts 
principles. 
 We also believe that our result is not inconsistent 
with the holding in Miles that future earnings, one of the major 
components of survival damages, are not available to a Jones Act 
seaman.  Unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act does provide for a survival 
action, and under the Jones Act, recovery on a survival action is 
limited to losses suffered during the decedent's lifetime.  See 
45 U.S.C.A. § 59 (1986); Miles, 498 U.S. at 35, 111 S. Ct. at 
327.  As Miles recognized, Congress made the decision in the 
Jones Act to place a limit on a seaman's recovery, and hence the 
Supreme Court should not disregard "Congress' ordered system of 
recovery," id. at 36, 111 S. Ct. at 328, by supplementing 
recovery, even if forceful policy arguments favored recovery of 
future earnings, id. at 35-36, 111 S. Ct. at 327 ("There are 
indeed strong policy arguments for allowing [recovery of future 
earnings]."). 
 But the Jones Act applies only to seamen.  And Yamaha 
has not demonstrated that Congress intended the limitation on 
damages in the Jones Act to extend beyond seamen.  By its terms, 
the act is strictly limited to a certain class of plaintiffs.  We 
believe that a state statute allowing recovery of future earnings 
would not be plainly inconsistent with the federal law, nor would 
it frustrate Congress' scheme of compensation for seamen, when it 
  
is applied to people who fall outside the scope of the 
congressionally mandated recovery scheme for maritime injuries 
and death.30  See also Garner v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., 768 
F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D. W. Va. 1991) (holding that Miles does not 
preclude loss of future earnings in death of a non-seaman because 
Jones Act does not extend to non-seamen).31  In sum, we hold that 
                     
30
  The Second Circuit has stated that the Court's language in 
Miles did not limit its holding to Jones Act seamen.  See 
Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Inc., 4 F.3d 1084, 1093 (2d 
Cir. 1993).  The Second Circuit reached this conclusion by 
stating: 
 
 The Court's analysis relied heavily upon the decedent's 
status as a seaman and the resultant applicability of 
the Jones Act, but the announced conclusion of its 
opinion (unlike the companion ruling as to loss of 
society) was not confined to seamen. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  However, the language from the 
conclusion in Miles -- "We . . . hold that a general maritime 
survival action cannot include recovery for decedent's lost 
future earnings," 498 U.S. at 37, 111 S. Ct. at 328 -- clearly 
referenced the particular decedent involved in that case.  The 
language did not say "a decedent" or "any decedent."  It simply 
said "decedent."  We believe that the Second Circuit's reading of 
the conclusion is not compelled by the language, and given that 
such a reading ignores the Court's rationale for denying future 
earnings, we decline to follow it.  See also Sutton v. Earles, 26 
F.3d 903, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (criticizing Wahlstrom and 
declining to follow its denial of loss-of-society damages to non-
dependent parents). 
31
  Even assuming that the Miles holding extends beyond seamen, 
we are not sure that its rule against future earnings would 
extend to deny recovery of such earnings in the case at bar.  The 
rule denying lost future earnings, implied from the exclusivity 
of the Jones Act, presupposes that the decedent had a livelihood 
and that his dependents would be entitled to damages for loss of 
support under the wrongful death provision.  Apparently, the 
Jones Act denies recovery of lost future earnings only because, 
as Miles explained: 
 
 Recovery of lost future earnings in a survival suit will, in 
many instances, be duplicative of recovery by 
  
general maritime law does not preempt state law survival statutes 
in survival actions based on the death of a nonseaman in 
territorial waters, and that such statutes consequently govern 
the instant case.  We turn therefore to the question whether the 
federal maritime law displaces state wrongful death remedies. 
 
 B.  WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES 
 Whether federal admiralty law preempts state wrongful 
death statutes from applying to accidents to non-seamen in 
territorial waters presents a more difficult inquiry.  Moragne 
apparently creates a federal wrongful death remedy that applies 
                                                                  
dependents for loss of support in a wrongful death 
action; the support dependents lose as a result of the 
seaman's death would have come from the seaman's future 
earnings. 
 
Miles, 498 U.S. at 35, 111 S. Ct. at 327.  This rationale appears 
to be quite suspect when the decedent is someone who is not 
employed, especially a child.  A child does not typically support 
her parents and so loss of support damages will be negligible.  A 
child's expected future earnings, however, may be considerable.  
Allowing for lost future earnings under such circumstances raises 
minimal risk of duplicative recovery.  In our view, to deny loss 
of future earnings under such circumstances gives a windfall to 
potential defendants.  Thus, even if there is a federal rule 
which extends beyond seamen to conflict with a state survival 
statute allowing recovery of lost future earnings, we doubt that 
the federal rule would extend to deny lost future earnings when 
the decedent was a child and loss of support damages would be 
negligible.  We also doubt its applicability to cases where the 
decedent was an adult who, unlike a Jones Act seaman, was 
unemployed.  This analysis, we add, is not intended to suggest 
case-by-case preemption analysis, but rather to demonstrate why, 
in policy terms, the construction advanced by Yamaha is flawed 
and hence unlikely to have animated the Supreme Court.  See 
Garner, 768 F. Supp. at 195. 
  
to non-seamen in territorial waters.32  Yamaha argues that 
Moragne therefore displaces state wrongful death statutes.  But 
although we know that Moragne provides a wrongful death remedy, 
the precise contours of that remedy are not yet fully defined.33  
                     
32
  The Moragne remedy might apply only to Jones Act seamen and 
to those others, including longshoremen, to whom a federal duty 
of seaworthiness or due care is owed.  Moragne explicitly 
grounded its holding in the propriety of extending a federal 
remedy to correspond to the "federally imposed duties of maritime 
law," filling a gap left by some state statutes.  See Moragne, 
398 U.S. at 401 & n.15, 90 S. Ct. at 1788. 
33
  Even if Moragne did provide a clear rule of decision in this 
area, however, the mere existence of a federal wrongful death 
cause of action does not necessarily require displacement.  Cf. 
California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02, 109 S. Ct. 
1661, 1665 (1989) (concurrent application of federal and state 
rules of decision are allowed); Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 224, 106 
S. Ct. at 2495 ("States could `modify' or `supplement' the 
federal maritime law by providing a wrongful death remedy 
enforceable in admiralty for accidents on territorial waters.") 
(citing Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S. Ct. 89 
(1921), and Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 21 L. Ed. 369 
(1873)); GILMORE & BLACK § 1-17, at 49-50 ("All that can be said in 
general is that the states may not flatly contradict established 
maritime law, but may `supplement' it, to the extent of allowing 
maritime recoveries in some cases where the maritime law denies 
them . . . .").  Concurrent application of state and federal law 
is commonplace, particularly in areas governed by federal common 
law.  See, e.g., ARC America, 490 U.S. at 101-02, 109 S. Ct. at 
1665 (antitrust); Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 
U.S. 556, 561, 74 S. Ct. 298, 301 (1954) ("Aside from its 
inability to provide a remedy in rem for a maritime cause of 
action, . . . a state, `having concurrent jurisdiction, is free 
to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as 
it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to make changes in 
the `substantive maritime law.") (quoting Red Cross Line, 264 
U.S. at 124, 44 S. Ct. at 277). 
 Indeed even where the states may impose liability beyond 
that imposed under federal law, there is not necessarily a 
conflict, particularly in the absence of a statement from 
Congress to the contrary.  See ARC America, 490 U.S. at 105, 109 
S. Ct. at 1667 ("Ordinarily, state law causes of action are not 
pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and above 
that authorized by federal law, . . . and no clear purpose of 
Congress indicates that we should decide otherwise in this 
  
Unless applying state law would be inconsistent with, or would 
frustrate the operation of, a particular federal maritime rule of 
decision in this area, Moragne should not displace state law 
rules of decision for deaths of non-seamen in territorial 
waters.34 
 Yamaha's argument that Moragne displaces all state 
wrongful death statutes as rules of decision is fairly 
                                                                  
case.") (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257-
58, 104 S. Ct. 615, 626-27 (1989), and California v. Zook, 336 
U.S 725, 736, 69 S. Ct. 841, 847 (1949)).  In the traditional 
concurrent application of state law context, in which there is a 
clear federal rule, a legitimate state law may still apply if it 
does not impose too great a burden on the uniform vindication of 
the federal policy.  See, e.g., Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 630 
(describing the interest-balancing approach and suggesting that 
the inquiry reduces to the "familiar one of burden").  Here, by 
contrast, there is no specific federal rule on point, and we thus 
need not analyze the question under the rubric of 
"incorporation."  State law, subject to possible preemption on 
grounds we have enumerated, applies of its own force.  See, e.g., 
Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 316, 75 S. Ct. at 371 ("[The 
`literal performance' rule of insurance contracts law] has not 
been judicially established as part of the body of federal 
admiralty law in this country.  Therefore, the scope and validity 
of the [maritime insurance] policy provisions here involved and 
the consequences of breaching them can only be determined by 
state law unless we are now prepared to fashion controlling 
federal rules."). 
34
  And were Moragne to extend to persons in Natalie Calhoun's 
circumstances, we might hold that its wrongful death remedy 
either does not displace or actually incorporates state (and 
territorial) law; "the demand for uniformity is not inflexible 
and does not preclude the balancing of the competing claims of 
state, national and international interests."  Wilburn Boat Co., 
348 U.S. at 323-24, 75 S. Ct. at 376 (Frankfurter, J., concurring 
in the result).  As our analysis below indicates, Congress has 
expressed an affirmative intent, as far as civilians are 
concerned, to preserve state law remedies in territorial waters.  
See infra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
  
straightforward:  both DOHSA and the Jones Act preempt state 
wrongful death statutes, so why shouldn't Moragne?35  This 
argument, at least on its face, is seductive.  Tallentire, 
Higginbotham, and Miles are to at least a certain extent the 
lineal descendants of Jensen, which introduced the importance of 
"uniformity" in admiralty law and stressed the preeminence of 
federal maritime law over state law rules of decision.  See 
Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S. Ct. at 529.36 
 But unlike the situations in Tallentire, Higginbotham, 
and Miles, each of which implicated clearly articulated federal 
statutory schemes, the Moragne cause of action in this context 
                     
35
  The rule that the Jones Act preempts state remedies stems 
from Lindgren and Gillespie (which held that the Jones Act was 
the exclusive remedy for survivors of seamen killed in 
territorial waters).  These cases may not have survived Moragne, 
see GILMORE & BLACK § 6-32, at 368 (saying that Moragne effectively 
overruled Lindgren and Gillespie), although in Miles the Court 
suggested that at least with respect to the issue of the 
preemption of state remedies, Lindgren and Gillespie are still 
good law.  See Miles, 498 U.S. at 29, 111 S. Ct. at 324 ("[T]he 
preclusive effect of the Jones Act established in Lindgren and 
Gillespie extends only to state remedies . . . .") (citing 
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 396, n.12, 90 S. Ct. at 1785 n.12).  At all 
events, the premise of Yamaha's argument that the federal 
statutes displace all state remedies is not free from doubt, even 
where the federal statutes apply. 
36
  Of course Justice Holmes dissented in Jensen, uttering what 
is perhaps his best known statement:  "The common law is not a 
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some 
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified."  244 U.S. 
at 222, 37 S. Ct. at 531 (Holmes, J. dissenting).  And Jensen has 
since been called the Lochner of the federal maritime law.  See 
American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 991 (Stevens, J. concurring) 
("Jensen is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case 
today as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905), 
would be in a case under the Due Process Clause.") (parallel 
citation omitted). 
  
reflects anything but a clearly articulated scheme.  Not only has 
Congress said nothing about the applicability of particular 
remedies, but the Court's common law has not either.  And since 
Moragne explicitly left open a number of questions about 
remedies, application of state remedies remains permissible to 
the extent they do not conflict with whatever settled principles 
exist.37  This proposition is true whether state laws operate to 
plaintiffs' or defendants' benefit.  See, e.g., Brockington v. 
Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1528-33 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam) (applying exclusivity provisions of Georgia Worker's 
                     
37
  Although Yamaha has been able to muster considerable support 
in the case law for its position that Moragne displaces all state 
wrongful death statutes, the case law appears to be split on this 
issue.  Compare Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 
1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing cases); Nelson v. United 
States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980); Choat v. Kawasaki 
Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626 (Ala. 1994); Texaco Ref. & Mktg., 
Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1991) 
(holding that Moragne displaces state wrongful death and survival 
statutes), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 301 (1991), with Ellenwood v. 
Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1280 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993) 
("Even today, plaintiffs may invoke state wrongful death statutes 
under the saving clause insofar as they involve accidents in 
territorial waters and do not conflict with the substantive 
principles developed under the maritime wrongful death 
doctrine."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2987 (1993); Lyon v. Ranger 
III, 858 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (applying 
Massachusetts state law as its rule of decision in wrongful death 
action brought by survivor of person killed in a scuba accident 
within Massachusetts territorial waters).  Cf. Favorito v. 
Pannell, 27 F.3d 716 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Rhode Island law 
to claims arising from allision of small boat with anchored 
vessel within Rhode Island's territorial waters and citing Lyon); 
Marine Transp. Serv. v. Python High Performance, 16 F.3d 1133 
(11th Cir. 1994) (although recognizing that general maritime law 
was applicable to the claim under admiralty jurisdiction, 
nevertheless applying principles of Florida equitable estoppel 
law in commercial dispute). 
  
Compensation Act to exclude additional recovery under general 
federal maritime law to nonmaritime worker injured within 
territorial waters), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S. Ct. 676 
(1991). 
 Prior to Moragne, it was well established that state 
wrongful death statutes could apply to maritime deaths occurring 
in territorial waters.  Lindgren, 281 U.S. at 43-44, 50 S. Ct. at 
210 ("[Before the Jones Act], in the absence of any legislation 
by Congress, . . . where a seaman's death resulted from a 
maritime tort on navigable waters within a State whose statutes 
gave a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the 
admiralty courts could entertain a libel in personam for the 
damages sustained by those to whom such right was given.");38 
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 245, 63 
S. Ct. 246, 251 (1942) ("[A]dmiralty courts, when invoked to 
protect rights rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the 
issues in accordance with the substantive law of the State."); 
The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 590-91, 79 S. Ct. at 505-06 (pre-Moragne 
rights of non-seaman killed in state territorial waters depend on 
state wrongful death statute).39 
                     
38
  See also id. at 44, 50 S. Ct. at 210 ("[S]such statutes `were 
not a part of the general maritime law' and were recognized only 
because Congress had not legislated on the subject."). 
39
  This aspect of the holding of The Tungus retains vitality 
post-Moragne, for the Moragne Court "concluded that the primary 
source of the confusion [in the law of maritime wrongful deaths] 
is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The Harrisburg," 
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 378, 90 S. Ct. at 1776, only the latter of 
which Moragne accordingly overruled.  Id. at 409, 90 S. Ct. at 
1792. 
  
 Furthermore, Moragne itself showed no hostility to 
concurrent application of state wrongful death statutes.  Indeed, 
to read into Moragne the idea that it was placing a ceiling on 
recovery for wrongful death, rather than a floor, is somewhat 
ahistorical.  The Moragne cause of action was in many respects a 
gap filling measure to ensure that seamen (and their survivors) 
would all be treated alike.  Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 596, 608 n.19, 
94 S. Ct. at 820, 826 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The "humane 
and liberal" purpose underlying the general maritime remedy of 
Moragne was driven by the idea that survivors of seamen killed in 
state territorial waters should not have been barred from 
recovery simply because the tort system of the particular state 
in which a seaman died did not incorporate special maritime 
doctrines.  It is difficult to see how this purpose can be taken 
as an intent to preclude the operation of state laws that do 
supply a remedy. 
 Of course, as we have mentioned above, Moragne also 
recognized the importance of federal statutory commands in 
shaping the general maritime wrongful death remedy -- both in the 
way in which it created a general maritime wrongful death remedy, 
and in its suggestion that courts should look to statutes for 
guidance in developing the contours of that remedy.  And post-
Moragne jurisprudence has given that principle preeminence.  But 
a proper application of this principle, in our view, shows that 
state wrongful death statutes should not be displaced in this 
context.  Our principal guidance on this issue comes from 
  
Tallentire and its interpretation of DOHSA, the one federal 
statute applicable to non-seamen. 
 Although Tallentire held that DOHSA displaced state 
wrongful death statutes for deaths on the high seas, its analysis 
of Section 7 of DOHSA is of considerable importance in 
understanding the extent to which the DOHSA remedies should not 
be treated as the exclusive types of remedies in a Moragne cause 
of action.  Of decisional importance in Tallentire was the notion 
that by enacting Section 7 of DOHSA, Congress intended to 
preserve concurrent state jurisdiction for maritime deaths within 
state territorial waters.  As we have discussed in the previous 
section, the Court stressed that the animating purpose of Section 
7 was to preserve to the states "jurisdiction to provide wrongful 
death remedies under state law for fatalities on territorial 
waters," and that "[b]ecause DOHSA by its terms extended only to 
the high seas and therefore was thought not to displace [state 
wrongful death remedies] on territorial waters, § 7, as 
originally proposed, ensured that the Act saved to survivors of 
those killed on territorial waters the ability to pursue a state 
wrongful death remedy in state court."40  Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 
225, 106 S. Ct. at 2495 (internal citation omitted).  Tallentire 
thus tells us that DOHSA was affirmatively intended to preserve 
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  See also id. ("The felt necessity for a DOHSA saving clause, 
then, may be traced to the fact that [state] wrongful death 
statutes like workmen's compensation schemes were not common law 
remedies, and thus may not have been deemed saved to suitors 
under the Judiciary Act of 1789, as construed in Jensen.") 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
  
state wrongful death remedies for survivors of people killed in 
territorial waters.  This intent to preserve state wrongful death 
remedies in state territorial waters should not be lightly 
disregarded, particularly since Moragne and its progeny say 
nothing explicit about abrogating state remedies. 
 Tallentire's interpretation of DOHSA is also important 
for another reason.  It suggests that there is a more fundamental 
flaw in Yamaha's argument that the incorporation of DOHSA's 
provisions into a Moragne cause of action should be treated as 
displacing all state wrongful death remedies.  If Yamaha is 
right, it means that Moragne gives DOHSA preclusive effect in an 
area (maritime deaths in state territorial waters) in which 
Congress explicitly intended DOHSA to have no such effect.  See 
The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 608, 79 S. Ct. at 514 ("It is odd to draw 
restrictive inferences from a statute whose purpose was to extend 
recovery for wrongful death.").  So interpreted, Moragne would 
thus transform a statute explicitly designed to preserve state 
remedies into one that would displace them.  In our view, such a 
result would cut Moragne loose from its conceptual moorings and 
disregard Supreme Court teachings since Moragne that we must look 
to congressional statutory commands to determine what remedies 
are available for maritime deaths. 
 But even if DOHSA is not treated as explicitly allowing 
state law to operate in this area, at the very least the 
legislative history of DOHSA shows no hostility toward the 
application of state wrongful death statutes in territorial 
waters.  See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 588 n.22, 94 S. Ct. at 816 n.22.  
  
And since a "clear conflict" must exist before state law is 
displaced by federal admiralty law, see Askew, 411 U.S. at 325, 
93 S. Ct. at 1600, we cannot find that Moragne displaces state 
wrongful death remedies for deaths of non-seamen in territorial 
waters.  Because we see no congressional intent to preclude the 
operation of state wrongful death statutes, and, indeed, believe 
that DOHSA arguably preserves state wrongful death remedies in 
territorial waters, we hold that state wrongful death statutes 
provide the rule of decision when a recreational boater is killed 
in territorial waters. 
 We find support for this result in Judge Breyer's 
opinion in Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(applying Massachusetts state law as its rule of decision in 
wrongful death action brought by survivor of person killed in 
scuba accident within Massachusetts territorial waters), and the 
views of a leading commentator, 14 Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3672 at 295 (2d ed. Supp. 1994) 
("If the same accident [one falling within the provisions of 
DOHSA] occurs within a marine league from shore, where [DOHSA] 
has no effect, the survivors can recover damages under the state 
wrongful death statute, including, when provided, reimbursement 
for non-economic losses.").  Cf. Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 631 
(holding that the federal maritime economic loss rule of Robbins 
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), which denies 
recovery for purely economic losses, did not displace a Rhode 
Island statute that allowed damages for some economic losses). 
  
 We also believe our holding to be in full accord with 
the principle of uniform vindication of federal maritime policies 
that, however attenuated, see supra at typescript Error! Bookmark 
not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined., has generally been 
considered the hallmark of conflicts jurisprudence in admiralty 
law.  In terms of the notion of uniformity, Yamaha's claim 
basically boils down to the following proposition:  state 
wrongful death statutes cannot apply to deaths to recreational 
boaters in territorial waters because it would raise the 
possibility of different remedies depending on the location of 
the accident and the citizenship of the parties.41  But Yamaha 
"heralds the need for uniformity without an appreciation for the 
boundaries of its relevance."  Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 
984 F.2d 1270, 1279 (1st Cir. 1993).  The argument simply proves 
too much.  "All state laws, if given effect in admiralty cases, 
interfere to a degree with the uniformity of admiralty law."  1 
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 112, at 7-36. 
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  Yamaha states, in terrorem: 
  
  The Calhouns argue against the weight of authority and 
against the concept of uniformity; instead they 
espouse a different remedy for civilians injured 
in territorial waters than that afforded seamen 
and maritime workers by Congress and the Supreme 
Court.  If accepted, their argument would result 
in at least 50 different possible measures of 
damages for the same cause of action, depending 
solely on the citizenship of the decedent and/or 
the place of the accident. 
 
Reply/Answering Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 1-2. 
  
 Perhaps recognizing that its uniformity argument proves 
too much, Yamaha advanced a variant of it at oral argument, 
suggesting that accepting the Calhouns' position on available 
damages would lead to the following allegedly untenable result:  
in an accident on a ship in which a non-seaman and a seaman were 
each killed, the non-seaman's survivors would potentially be 
entitled (depending on the state statute) to higher damages than 
those available to the survivors of the seaman.  This result, 
however, is untenable only if we assume that a person's statutory 
status should be irrelevant for purposes of determining recovery 
for maritime deaths.  But Miles, by denying loss of society 
damages to the survivor of a seaman because the seaman was 
covered by the Jones Act, has told us that such status does make 
a difference.  498 U.S. at 32-33, 111 S. Ct. at 325-26.42 
 More fundamentally, however, it is fairly common for 
tort systems to allow different recoveries based on the injured 
party's status.  The problem Yamaha poses arises all of the time, 
whenever two parties are injured in the same event but one is 
covered by worker's compensation and the other is not.  Even 
within maritime law, differing recoveries based on status occur 
all of the time.  Longshoremen and seamen can often be injured in 
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  The case law is replete with statements that non-seamen 
should not be entitled to damages in greater amounts than seaman 
because allowing recovery would not foster admiralty's aim of 
providing special solicitude to seamen.  See, e.g., Wahlstrom, 4 
F.3d at 1092.  But this argument seems to us to be a non 
sequitur, for it is difficult to see how denying recovery to non-
seamen's survivors shows any special solicitude to seamen or 
their survivors. 
  
the same event, but a longshoreman covered by LHWCA, 33 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 901 et seq. (1986), cannot sue under the doctrine of 
unseaworthiness, while a seaman can. 
 A similar asymmetry exists between non-seamen and 
seamen where non-seamen cannot take advantage of the doctrine of 
unseaworthiness.  See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 629, 79 S. Ct. 406, 409 (1959); 
Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 294 n.11 
(5th Cir. 1990).  For instance, should a non-seaman and a seaman 
be injured due to a non-negligent but unseaworthy condition of 
the vessel, the seaman would recover and the non-seaman would 
not.  This analogy has especial importance because in Moragne 
itself a negligence theory was at all times still available to 
the plaintiff.43 
 Indeed, this case is, in many respects, the mirror 
image of Moragne.  Moragne was driven by the realization that the 
state wrongful death tort system simply could not be grafted 
wholesale onto the regime governing torts affecting seamen.  398 
U.S. at 401, 90 S. Ct. at 1788 (stating that its holding would 
remove the "tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from 
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  It is often a quite reasonable choice for a group of 
potential plaintiffs to give up the prospect of huge damages in 
return for easier theories of recovery, and vice versa.  The 
trade-off that the longshoreman received in exchange for losing 
the right to sue on an unseaworthiness theory was an increase in 
the compensation benefits under the LHWCA and expanded coverage.  
See GILMORE & BLACK § 6-53, at 437 & n.339.  More specifically, a 
trade-off similar to the one made in the context of longshore 
workers' injuries seems quite reasonable in the context of this 
case. 
  
the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to 
exclusively maritime substantive concepts").  To accept Yamaha's 
position in this case would create the opposite of the problem 
faced in Moragne, for we would be grafting a compensation scheme 
designed principally for seamen onto cases that fit easily within 
the tort systems developed by the states.  This case is, at base, 
no different than a cause of action arising out of the average 
motor vehicle accident. 
 Finally, we note that states have substantial interests 
in policing their territorial waterways and protecting their 
citizens through their tort systems.  In light of such interests, 
we should be loath to displace their statutes under our federal 
common law power absent a clear federal rule.  See American 
Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 992 (Stevens, J. concurring) (citing 
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992)).  
Although we recognize that the rule barring state claims if they 
conflict with basic maritime principles often requires a delicate 
accommodation of federal and state interests, here, in the 
absence of a clear federal interest, we think that the balance 
tips in favor of allowing state law to apply.  In sum, we hold 
that general maritime law does not preempt state law wrongful 
death acts in actions based on the death of a nonseaman in 
territorial waters, and that such acts therefore govern this 
case. 
 
 V.  CONCLUSION 
  
 For reasons we have explained above, before reaching 
the question certified by the district court it is necessary to 
determine what law governs this dispute, and the bulk of our 
opinion has been devoted to resolving that difficult question.  
We have concluded that whether loss of society, loss of support 
and services, future earnings, or punitive damages are available 
for the death of a non-seaman in territorial waters is a question 
to be decided in accordance with state law.  We do not, however, 
reach the question of which state's law -- Pennsylvania's or 
Puerto Rico's -- applies.  The district court did not consider 
that issue, and we decline to do so, preferring to have the 
district court address it in the first instance.  Accordingly, we 
do not answer the certified question in terms.  (As explained 
earlier, see supra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-
Error! Bookmark not defined., under Section 1292(b) we need not 
reach the certified question, but only decide the appeal from the 
challenged order.)  We have, however, given the district court 
sufficient guidance so that it may now do so with facility.  
Since the question of which state's law applies is plainly open, 
we will affirm the district court's order denying defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on loss of society and loss of 
support damages, but we will reverse the order granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment on lost future earnings 
and punitive damages. 
 
 The parties shall bear their own costs. 
 _______________________________ 
  
 
